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I. Introduction
The present work is based on part of the master’s thesis by the same author 
and on the field research (hence forth referred to in this article as “the field 
research”) performed for that thesis in Israel and in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (OPT) in 2010.
The article discusses aspects of Zionist national identity that have 
contributed to the creation and maintenance of the Israel/Palestine conflict, and 
the resistance of some Jews to this dominant state-inscribed identity, as well as 
the implications of changes in this identity.
The analysis discussed here illustrates the process through which Israeli and 
Diaspora Jews, although socialized in a Zionist environment, move away from 
or reject fundamental Zionist precepts and frequently engage in activism against 
Israeli policies regarding Palestinians, and against injustices committed against 
the Palestinian people by the Zionist enterprise for over six decades that the state 
of Israel has existed.
When thinking about the Israel/Palestine conflict from the perspective 
of the field of International Relations, it is possible to notice its relation to 
the conceptual structure of the modern international system of states, where 
identities are territorialized and need a state in order to obtain international 
recognition.
Besides this external definition of identity, through recognition granted 
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by others, modern states also depend on an internal definition of identity, the 
national identity.
Both the emergence of Zionism and the six-decade-long plight of the 
Palestinians have their origin in this state structure.
This discussion is based on the conception that modern national identities 
are discursively constructed and inscribed by the state, whose politics tend to 
reflect the same fundamental precepts which constitute the national identity.
II. Identity, International Relations and Political Science
Fearon (1999, p. 39) points out that the discussion on identity, due to 
its intrinsic imprecision and complexity, is somewhat delicate and has been 
frequently avoided in the fields of International Relations and Political Science. 
Waxman (2006, p. 5), however, criticizes the Realist school of the International 
Relations field, which denies the importance of considering identity in 
realpolitik approaches, and is concerned only with security and power. Waxman 
explains that the Realist approach considers that foreign policy and violent 
conflict between states originate from security issues, but fails to explain the 
occurrence of international cooperation and commerce. Moreover, it fails to 
account for the role that identity politics play in defining foreign policy and in 
stimulating conflict, both national and international, which can be considered a 
great omission for a field whose main concern is national security.
It is fitting then to question which underlying suppositions to this Realist 
approach allow for it to ignore such a fundamental issue as identity. The answer 
possibly lies in the supposition of an immutable character of the identity factor, 
in its stability or essential character.
Traditional conflict resolution approaches that propose negotiation, 
agreements etc. are frequently based on this same Realist supposition of the 
identities involved, by attempting to deal with them as given, immutable 
principles. These approaches, however, have proven unsuccessful in the case 
of the Israel/Palestine conflict, since it can be argued that fundamental precepts 
of modern Zionist identity, as we will see later in this article, do not allow for 
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accommodating any Palestinian needs or interests, which would be necessary for 
achieving any kind of agreement.
III. State-Inscribed Identities
A common perception of the Israel/Palestine conflict is its supposed 
unavoidability, given the apparent impossibility that the opposing sides involved 
can escape their identities, which in turn motivate their politics. Though there is 
evidence that such identities do exist, the phenomenon examined in this article 
(the rejection of Zionist precepts by Jews) questions the supposition that these 
identities are of an essential and immutable nature. Although it is not a new 
phenomenon, since movements of such nature have always existed throughout 
Israel’s history, a growing and increasingly organized number of Jews, while 
still a minority in Israel and Jewish communities around the world, have 
manifested opposition to Israeli policies regarding Palestinians. Often, these 
individuals become politically active, also advocating for restorative justice for 
the Palestinian people.
One of the main challenges for these Jews is in dealing with the Jewish 
majority, which does not show tolerance for such political postures. These 
individuals are frequently branded as traitors or self-hating Jews. This kind of 
delegitimization of political postures that oppose state-imposed identity is a way 
to avoid their significant discussion within Jewish circles. This delegitimizing 
reaction results from a perception of threat, since criticism of Israeli policy 
frequently coincides with a rejection of fundamental precepts of the dominant 
national identity, Zionism, inscribed in the Jewish population by the state of 
Israel, and is seen as negating its right to exist.
There is a somewhat tribal expectation among the Jewish majority that Jews 
should support Israel unconditionally, at least in reference to the Israel/Palestine 
conflict. The evident problem in this conception is that this support is expected 
based on identity, where Jewish identity presupposes Zionist identity, instead of 
on an analysis of the political actions applied by the state. 
Another form of delegitimizing political postures contrary to the Zionist 
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ones is the presupposition that the individuals who defend them are somehow 
predisposed to have them, having come from marginal groups of Jewish 
collectivity, distant from its real values. The attempt is again to shift the problem 
to the individuals, ignoring that the majority of Jews in the world is brought up 
Zionist, a supplemental fact to the exceptional character of Israel, which is not a 
state of its citizens, but of Jews wherever they might be.
IV. Identity-Change Triggers 
The field research points out results inconsistent with the delegitimizing 
claim mentioned in the previous paragraph, apparently making it void: among 
the thirteen interviewees, Israeli and Diaspora Jews engaged in activism against 
Israeli policies towards Palestinians, there were Jews of religious and secular 
origin — Ashkenazi, Sefaradi and Mizrahi(1) Jews — and even from Jewish 
settler families in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and some having been 
settlers themselves; all came from a diversity of Zionist environments and 
previously identified themselves as deeply Zionist.
The discovery that Israeli policy towards Palestinians is a natural extension 
of fundamental Zionist precepts, and the finding that these precepts and policies 
do not represent the moral values these individuals were brought up with, pushed 
the interviewees mentioned above into a process of de-identification from such 
precepts, at times to the point of ceasing to identify as Zionists. Such a process 
often stimulates an internal conversation, a reflection around how those people 
see and define themselves, as well as what identity they should adopt in a way it 
would reflect their fundamental values.
Identities on both sides of this conflict, Zionist and Palestinian, are 
significantly defined in relation to a hostile other. Some transformative 
experiences drive people to question the beliefs that have informed their 
identities so far. Such experiences were described by interviewees in the field 
Ashkenazi: Jews of European origin; Sefaradi: Jews from the Iberian Peninsula; Mizrahi: Jews 
from the Middle East, North Africa and the Caucasus.
(1)
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research, for instance: an Israeli soldier found out that his mission is to protect 
Jewish settlers while they commit crimes with impunity against Palestinians in 
their lands, cities, markets and homes (Haasz, 2011, pp. 104-106); or yet the 
same Israeli soldier found out there is a Palestinian Non-Violent Communication 
center in the OPT, which completely contradicted the dehumanized enemy-
image he sustained of Palestinians in his belief system (Haasz, 2011, p. 111); or 
the insight of yet another soldier that during night raids on Palestinian villages 
he took part in, Palestinian children might perceive him as Jewish children 
perceived Nazi soldiers invading their homes in Europe (Haasz, 2011, p. 117); 
the encounter of a Jewish American woman with Palestinians in an Arabic 
language course in Israel, in which they express to her they do not believe she is 
Jewish because she is treating them so kindly (Haasz, 2011, p. 122); 
All of these experiences contributed to the reversion of the perception 
of Palestinians as an essential hostile other in the eyes of the interviewees, 
humanizing the image of the Palestinian other, and generating insight into 
their own hostile, or better yet aggressive postures. By doing that, a new way 
of looking at the other is internalized, and individuals reach the point where 
changes in their choices of categories of identification, or in the name they give 
their identity become necessary in order to reflect this new way of perceiving 
this Palestinian other. Kelman (2004, p. 120) points out that “Internalization 
represents a readiness to change an attitude because the new attitude […] is 
more consistent with the person’s own, preexisting value system.” Kelman’s 
assertion points to the relation between identity and moral integrity we will 
touch upon further ahead in this paper.
V. Jewish Versus Zionist Identities: A Cognitive Dissonance
One of the main challenges in this context is to dissociate Jewish identity 
from Zionist identity, since the latter is constituted in a fashion where it co-opts 
the prior. The discussion about discursive amalgamation of Jewish and Zionist 
identities, as well as of concepts of Judaism and Jewishness (which we will 
touch on ahead) has been led by various thinkers, among which are Hannah 
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Arendt (1973, p. 66), Yeshaiahu Leibowitz (as cited in Rabkin, 2006, p. 34), 
and more recently Judith Butler (2004; 2011). These thinkers try to offer an 
alternative discourse to the Zionist one, showing these identities are different 
from one another, not essential to one another, nor dependent of each other, 
which allows Jews to look more critically at Israeli policies, as well as dissociate 
criticism of Zionist policies from anti-Semitism. 
Accusations of anti-Semitism have been another strategy to silence criticism 
of Zionist policies of the state of Israel. The mere existence of Jewish individuals 
who reject Zionist identity serves as an example that such dissociation between 
being critical of Zionism and being antissemitic exists.  
In the interviews summarizeded in this author’s master’s thesis, Israeli and 
Diaspora Jews reporting experiences that moved them to change their political 
posture and de-identify from, and even reject, Zionist precepts, a phenomenon 
which social psychology calls cognitive dissonance is described, which, 
according to Cooper (2007, p. 2), means incongruence between expectation and 
experience.
Formational narratives of the Zionist identity and morality of interviewees 
ceased to explain, confirm or justify the world they experience in practice. Let 
us consider two categories of experience to qualify the interviews: direct and 
indirect. Within the direct experience category there are various experiences told 
by soldiers, since military service is mandatory in Israel, in addition to many 
Jews who come from Diaspora communities to enlist as well. The field research 
(Haasz, 2011) has shown that these individuals were educated to defend their 
society from enemies who want to eliminate it. These individuals were willing 
to defend their society, which they perceived as a society that excels in its 
humanism and solidarity, in its advanced science and political liberalism, and 
which has suffered immensely in the past due to discrimination and racism, and 
above all, owes all of its special characteristics to its Jewish roots. The enemies, 
against which these soldiers were supposed to defend their people, are perceived 
as coming from backward cultures founded on religious extremism, and which 
throughout history have always had the goal of eliminating Israel or the Jewish 
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people.
When they enlisted in the military and volunteered to risk their lives in 
defense of this society, many of the interviewees found out they were the 
armed branch of an aggressive settler colonial enterprise, and that the enemy 
from which they supposedly had to defend the nation is an impoverished and 
defenseless population, kept under a castrating oppressive regime, having been 
expelled from their lands in which these same soldiers and their families now 
live. These interviews express great surprise, not only in discovering that the 
Palestinian other, before being framed in the enemy image described previously, 
is as human as they are, but mainly for noticing how their perception was 
manipulated, to the point of having believed that reality was very different from 
what they now know to be true.
In cases of indirect experience, interviewees have found in Jewish academic 
sources, such as the New Israeli Historians, that the history they have learned 
since childhood has been distorted, and instead of Israel having always been the 
victim that tried to defend itself, it was in fact responsible for a mass-expulsion 
of Palestinians from their lands, in operations similar to what after the war in 
Bosnia and Croatia in the 90’s came to be known as ethnic cleansing. Even 
violent attitudes on behalf of Palestinians started to be seen by these Jews as 
responses to oppression and injustice instead of aggression (Haasz, 2011).
VI. Reactions to Cognitive Dissonance: Reducing Incogruences
According to Leon Festinger, the psychologist who coined the term 
cognitive dissonance, individuals who go through such experience feel 
compelled to reduce incongruences (Cooper, 2007, p. 3). Festinger (1963) 
defends that among the forms of reducing incongruences that generate cognitive 
dissonance, we can find the modification of beliefs, attitudes and actions, which 
can explain de-identification, the process of adjusting or relinquishing a given 
identity. Such changes, according to various interviewees, tend to involve 
psychological and emotional suffering derived from a deep identity crisis, which 
typically lasts several years (Haasz, 2011). However, the majority of those 
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who have experienced cognitive dissonance choose other forms presented by 
Festinger (1963) for reducing incongruences, such as justifying, blaming and 
denying.
One of the interviewees in the field research, a Jewish Israeli activist who 
works in political tourism in Jerusalem, reeducates Jewish Israelis about the 
reality of the conflict and in regard to the discrepancies extant between this 
reality and the traditional Zionist narrative. He explains that the goal of his job 
is to take people to what he calls “the point of no return,” where they can no 
longer say “we were not aware,” to the point where they feel forced to take a 
stance — to choose between admitting they support the oppressive occupation 
policies of the Israeli government, even if just by omission, or to take a stance 
and possibly act against them. It is possible to say that this initiative compels 
people to choose between upholding their identity and relinquishing their values, 
or upholding their values and relinquishing their identity.
Upholding identity and changing one’s values is a tendency that Slavoj 
Žižek (1989, pp. 28-30) considers the way out through cynicism. He explains 
that cynically taking responsibility for actions that are commonly viewed as 
condemnable from the ethical or moral viewpoint, both by one’s own standards 
as well as by others’, is justified by suggesting conveniently that such actions 
are a necessary evil in order to deal with the harsh reality, or they are steps in a 
strategy to deal with a larger and more complex context, that can only be dealt 
with through such means. Žižek argues that in this way immoral conducts are 
approved as part of a deeper truth, and that only a complete contextualized exposé 
would counter such strategy, in order to find and keep the right perspective.
A possible observable example could be the controversial political 
postures of Israel’s Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, Avigdor 
Lieberman, leader of the extreme right wing party Israel Beiteinu. His rise to 
power represents a large portion of Israeli Jewish population (and possibly 
Diaspora Jews as well) that has turned more polarized and radicalized, openly 
supporting discriminatory policies against Palestinians, as a way of dealing with 
challenges to the legitimacy of Israel’s policies.
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VII. Identity, Morality and Historical Narrative
Various thinkers believe that identity represents the moral values of their 
holders, as Kelman’s (2004) ideas pointed out above. William James (in 
Erikson, 1994, p. 19) considers there is such a deep connection between identity 
and morality, that only by being faithful to one’s own moral values will the 
individual have the strongest sensation of being alive and active.  When an 
internal voice tells him “this is the real me!” Fearon (1999) affirms, “‘identity’ 
is modern formulation of dignity, pride, or honor.” Charles Taylor (1992, p. 27) 
says identity relates to the definition of what is “what is good, or valuable, or 
what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose.” Taylor also describes that 
in an identity crisis, individuals need to reorient themselves in “moral space.” 
These relations are observable in the accounts of the field research interviewees, 
when they describe changes in their national identity as unavoidable, in an 
attempt to recover their existential legitimacy and their dignity (Haasz, 2011). 
Other definitions of identity relate it to the historical narrative of a society. 
Stuart Hall (1990) describes identity as a discursive product of the way in which 
we make use of the narratives of the past, and not as a result of a recovery of 
the past, which “secures our sense of ourselves.” But maybe it is in combining 
identity, morality and narrative that we can find the key to unfold the complexity 
of the process of de-identification.
The emergence of the Israeli New Historians, as well as Israeli Critical 
Sociology and the post-Zionist academic production offer a discourse that not 
only counters official discourse regarding the traditional historical narrative, 
but also denies it and contradicts some of its most fundamental points. This 
reversion takes away a large part of the legitimacy of the narrative on which 
Zionist identity stands. Although it is becoming increasingly difficult for the 
state to support the production of official Zionist discourse, this is the version 
that still remains dominant among Jews and non-Jews around the world and in 
Israel. Ghazi Bouillon affirms that:
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The nationalist project is an intellectual as well as political project, and 
it relies on collective memory to reinforce its claims of a shared past and 
a common destiny. Clearly then, intellectuals stand at the heart of the 
nationalist enterprise because they assist in shaping the collective self-
imagination of the nation — not merely in the emergence and the initial 
stages of the formation of national identity, but throughout the continuous 
struggle for its redefinition. (2009, pp. 22, 23)
To know history, that is, to believe in the Zionist historical narrative, has 
become then, in the words of Edward Said, a “political knowledge” (1979, 
p. 9), since it has directed almost all of the Jewish population, as well as a large 
portion of the perception there was (and still is) of it in the Western world (Said, 
2001, pp. 3, 4), towards a political end — the Zionist enterprise. According to 
Ghazi Bouillon (2009, p. 32), this specific political knowledge “provides the 
bridge between a ‘nation’ and the justification of its right to a particular land.” 
VIII. Three-tiered analysis of Zionist Identity
Zionist identity, a product of this political knowledge, can be seen as 
structured on three fundamental precepts. Supported by assertions of Baruch 
Kimmerling (2005, p. I) and Ghazi Bouillon (2009, p. 158), this paper points to 
three aspects present in the majority of forms of Zionism nowadays: Jewishness, 
security-militarism and a Zionist hegemonic conception of the Jewish State, or 
simply put, hegemonic Zionism (Haasz, 2011).
1. Jewishness
The first precept, Jewishness, fundamental part of the political knowledge 
mentioned previously, is the premise that Judaism, not as a religion but as a 
secular culture, is central to Zionist identity and is the foundation of the notion 
that Israel, the home of the Jewish people from ancient to modern times, has to 
be a Jewish state. Such a conception is based in primordialist ideas, founded 
on the maintenance of the essence of the nation, the antiquity of the nation, 
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and base nationalism on culture. Such is the theory on nationalism by A. D. 
Smith that favors Zionist narrative with its conception of ethnie, a social unit 
attested by continuity between “modern national units and sentiments and the 
collective cultural units and sentiments of previous eras” (Smith, 1991, p. 14). 
Although it describes the characteristics that constitute a nation, this approach 
fails to explain the reasons why they do so, and to recognize the role of human 
agency in the process of creation of a nation. Benedict Anderson affirms “The 
significance of the emergence of Zionism and the birth of Israel is that the 
former marks the reimagining of an ancient religious community as a nation” 
(2006, p. 153).
Anderson’s theory (2006) about nationalism proposes that nations are the 
product of human agency, are modern, constructed and imagined. This theory 
better explains the processes of emergence of Zionism in XIX century Europe, 
when the influence of other national movements on secular Jewish intellectuals 
compelled them, in the face of various tendencies of pre-national or national 
identities, to shape their own national identity based on the same standards: 
ethnically defined groups with a common origin.  They feared that if they failed 
to do so, they would end up with no identity whatsoever (Sand, 2009, p. 77).
Among Jewish historians, the more nationalist and more widespread 
used biblical texts as historical documents (Sand, 2009, p. 71), although they 
themselves were secular Jews, members of a new form of being Jewish in 
Europe, following the emancipation of European Jews in late XVIII century.
Instrumentalizing narrative and Jewish religious symbology in the process 
of formation of a secular culture continued with the creators of Zionism, such 
as Ahad Ha’am, and later with its great leaders, such as Ben-Gurion, who did 
not have any interest in Jewish religion or Jewishness as the essence of Zionist 
political identity. 
2. Security-Militarism
The second precept, security-militarism, refers to the belief that Israel is 
under constant threat from Palestinians and other regional enemies, and needs 
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a severe security apparatus and a highly militarized society in order to survive. 
This pillar is based on and is justified by victimhood,(2) from which it extracts 
its legitimacy. The main argument is that security-militarism is necessary for the 
survival of the people and, more fundamentally, to protect it against unjustifiable 
aggressions, since it is believed that Israel has done nothing to deserve such 
aggressions.
Again, political knowledge in the form of Zionist historical narrative 
produces such a perception. Only with the emergence of New Israeli 
Historiography that such historical versions were discredited and based on Israeli 
governmental documents was it revealed that, in fact, the Zionist enterprise has 
caused and still sustains grave injustice against the Palestinian people.
According to Adi Ophir (2000), Israel strategically uses the position of 
victimhood as “aggressive victimhood ”. Ophir (2008, p. 87) says victimhood 
is culturally constructed and results in being a victim instead of becoming a 
victim; that is, permanently occupying the place of the victim. There are various 
problems that emerge from such a posture.
In criticism of affirmations by Emmanuel Levinas (1990), that persecution 
is one of the defining aspects of the Jewish people, Judith Butler (2005, 
p. 96) points out the danger in characterizing a group as persecuted and never 
as persecutor is to authorize in an unlimited fashion the use of aggression in the 
name of self-defense. Such aggressions are rarely examined since, according 
to Yftachel (2008, p. 130), “discourse developed in reaction to the Arab-
Jewish conflict, […] elevating exigencies of national security onto a level of 
unquestioned gospel.”
The Holocaust has a fundamental role in the victimhood aspect of Zionist 
identity. Sonnenschein, Bekerman e Horenczyk (2010, p. 60), in an experiment 
conducted in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem with Jewish and Palestinian 
Israeli students, concluded that “The Holocaust and persecution made up 
Victimhood: a state of feeling as a victim, different from victimization, act of becoming or 
turning others into a victim.
(2)
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a central and significant component in the national identity of the Jewish 
participants” and that: 
the persistent appearance of the existential threat during the dialogue and 
the apprehension that new options for defining the state would amount to a 
new holocaust point to the success of a broad existing process of education 
and indoctrination, a process that has constructed the Holocaust and the 
existential threat as key components of the identity of Jewish Israelis, and 
has transferred all that to the conflict with the Arabs in general and the 
Palestinians in particular. (Sonnenschein, Bekerman, and Horenczyk, 2010, 
p. 60)
The indoctrination mentioned is propagated by state apparatuses in 
Israel and abroad, through the educational system, official discourse, public 
commemorations and an immense cultural production around the subject. The 
state promotes organized visits to the Holocaust museum in Jerusalem and 
organizes trips to Nazi concentration and extermination camps in Poland for 
school students and soldiers. In the Diaspora there are a series of educational 
programs of the same kind, promoted by Zionist institutions.
3. Hegemonic Zionism
The third precept that composes Zionist identity, hegemonic Zionism, refers 
to an ideological paradigm formed by Zionism’s founders, who were secular 
European Jews. Relying on Foucaultian theories, Ghazi-Bouillon (2009, p. 22) 
describes how this hegemonic movement established its power through regimes 
of truth that defined the limits within which any debate or discussion about 
Zionism could occur in a way that made sense, as well as everything that could 
be thought, imagined or said about the issue, determining a new perceptual 
domain. As a form of political power, discourse is a resource that allows a 
group, in this case the Ashkenazi Jews, to gain ascendency over other concurrent 
groups, in this case the other Jewish groups that possess other views of Jewish 
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identity, submitting them to the hegemonic Zionism. This discourse produces a 
thought structure that includes historical narrative, ideology and state practices, 
and, being deeply embedded in the state structure, influences the production of 
its self-knowledge.
These three precepts seem to compose the base of Zionist identity in most 
cases, where Jews believe, or know, they are descendants of the biblical Jewish 
people, thus having historical right to their land, and that their existence is 
in constant danger due to the intention of their enemies, motivated by anti-
Semitism, to eliminate them, which brings about the necessity for protection. 
This protection is conceptualized, based in ideas that structure the modern 
international system of states, where ties of identity to territoriality preach the 
need for a Jewish state and, although supported by a narrative that has little 
academic, scientific or historical support, just the same conserves itself in the 
two first precepts. The third precept crystalizes perception of the first two, not 
allowing even a suspicion of the possibility of questioning these foundations in 
most Jewish circles. Moreover, in geographical and cultural contrast with the 
environment where Israel is located, the Middle East, Israel sustains a Western 
self-image. The dominance of European Jews, the Ashkenazim, is still sustained 
over all other Jewish groups in Israel, even though the Likud right wing party 
had more success in the 70’s in including in its bases Mizrahi Jews and other 
minority groups than its labor party predecessors, thus taking predominant 
political control of Israel ever since and allowing for greater inclusion and socio-
economic ascendence of Mizrahi Jews.  To date there has never been a prime 
minister in Israel that has not been Ashkenazi.
IX. Identity Blinders 
There is a large-scale acceptance of the official Zionist narrative and the 
national identity inscribed by the state in the society from which it derives. To 
“‘unconsciously subject’ to the past cultural choices of [the] forefathers […] 
who helped define the ‘tradition’ which they [in this case, Zionist Jews] are now 
endeavoring to defend,” according to Shani (2007, p. 13), is “nothing other than 
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the forgetting of history.” Shani explains this using Pierre Bourdieu’s notion 
of habitus: “embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten 
as history — is the active presence of the whole past of which it is a product” 
(Bourdieu 1990, p. 56, in Shani, 2007, p. 14).
However, in the process of rejecting these precepts, occurs also a rejection 
of the main motives for the existence of the conflict, opening the doors to 
solutions that are more flexible and inclusive of all parties involved, more 
pluralistic and without territorial barriers.
A good example of how pervasive hegemonic Zionist discourse is, is the 
surprise reported by the New Historians in interview to Ghazi Bouillon (2009), 
as well as by other post-Zionist scholars, whose profession is historical political 
and sociological knowledge, among others, when they made their discoveries by 
analyzing governmental documents that had been recently turned public in the 
80’s, and served as basis for the emergence of the Israeli New Historiography.
Likewise, field research interviewees have reported the shock they felt when 
they encountered a radically different reality from the one they had expected, 
due to the influence of the above-described Zionist precepts. Some of them were 
amazed at the absolute absence of Jewish values in the actions of the Israeli 
government, and others, more secular, refused to accept Judaism as a personal 
argument for any violence committed against Palestinians. All of them expressed 
disgust in discovering they were part of the aggressor element, described as the 
security apparatus of Israel. The Holocaust was a recurring subject, in the sense 
that it led them to think about the roles of victim and oppressor, comparing 
themselves at times to the Nazis, although not to the degree of the aggression 
committed, but with repulsion for the fact that they occupied the same role in 
relation to the Palestinians in the same dichotomic relation: victim-oppressor 
(Haasz, 2011).
Lilly Weissbrod (1997, p. 62) writes from the Zionist perspective, and 
affirms that Israel has developed a ‘society-specific’ identity, where a unique 
collective identity is highly valued, and made impossible to be based on 
universal values. Weissbrod (2002, p. 222) sees the Israeli version of a “Jewish-
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ethnic” democracy simply as its own interpretation of democracy, just as other 
western countries have theirs. Judith Butler writes: 
…the formulation of classically liberal principles of citizenship that 
would forbid discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and ethnicity, 
for example, are construed as ‘destructive’ of the Jewish state and if that 
formulation resounds with ‘destruction of the Jewish people,’ especially 
under those conditions where the Jewish state claims to represent the Jewish 
people, than this view establishes classical liberalism as genocide. (2011, 
p. 76)
X. The Identity Factor in Conflict Transformation
When reflecting on the innumerous international initiatives that try to 
influence the reality of the conflict, a grave problem that repeats itself is the 
reliance on universal values represented by international law and human rights. 
As Butler (2011) points out, these values tend not to mean the same to Zionist 
identity on one saide, and to the organizations or states that attribute universality 
to such values on the other. These universal references, in the Zionist context, 
can be perceived as a risk of destruction of the state and, potentially, of 
the Jewish people. Maybe even worse than the perception of threat felt by 
Zionists when attempting to debate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or Zionism’s 
legitimacy, is the lack of perception of the conditions that allow it to happen.
As Erikson (1979, pp. 102-103) points out, there will always be a defensive 
reaction “against insights which seem to rob us from our self-made certainty,” 
in this case the legitimacy of hegemonic Zionist narrative. There are signs, 
however, that in internal dynamics between Zionist and non-Zionist Jews, like 
in initiatives for social justice and peace advocacy, there is a higher potential for 
transformation.
According to Sonnenschein, Bekerman e Horenczyk (2010, p. 60), the 
perception of threat, differently from bi-national discussion environments 
(between Palestinians and Jews), tends to diminish in uni-national discussion 
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settings (between Jews) where the discussion of the most difficult points and 
painful change in worldview tend to happen more easily.
XI. Conclusion
When discussing Zionist identity as discursively constructed and inscribed 
in society by the state, opposing it to processes and internal dynamics of national 
identity change that act as forms of resistance to those state-inscribed identities, 
we are able to raise important questions regarding approaches to the Israel/
Palestine conflict. Questions of identity underlying political realities govern the 
interests of their constituencies (Zionist Jews in Israel and in the Diaspora) —
interests that can change according to alterations in the national identity of these 
individuals.
Up to this point in time, negotiations and peace agreements on the official 
political level have only led to deterioration of the situation for Palestinians 
in the conflict. Political activism, although providing a platform on which 
to demonstrate dissent from Israeli policies, as well as for advocacy and 
pressure for the resolution of the situation, has served in the hands of the Israeli 
government to further radicalize the Jewish population, being misrepresented as 
a modern version of anti-Semitism. 
Initiatives by Jewish interlocutors challenge Zionist traditional discourse 
from inside the Jewish population, looking not only to denounce injustice 
against Palestinians, but also to reformulate national identity and bring it 
closer to a common denominator with the international community. The sought 
common ground is one of universal values and references such as international 
law and human rights, and classical liberal principles of citizenship which forbid 
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and ethnicity. It is fitting then 
to question whether stronger international support for such initiatives would 
not prove more efficient in transforming the conflict (phasing it out), rather 
than attempting to resolve it (managing what is) since Zionist identity with its 
fundamental precepts does not admit the possibilty for a solution that would 
allow dignity to the Palestinian people as well.
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<Summary>
Yuri Haasz 
This article discusses how processes through which some Israeli and 
Diaspora Jews resist the state-inscribed national identity, Zionism, relate to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.This discussion is held against the backdrop of a 
critical approach to the modern international system of states, and its influence 
in engendering and maintanance of the conflict.This article also challenges 
views which consider the concept of identity as either static, or, if dynamic, 
too complex to consider, discarding it from political context analisys. It points 
out the importance of taking the identity factor into account in approaches to 
conflict resolution.The processes described in this article exposes the non-
essential nature of Zionist national identity, and the challenges that Individuals 
going through it face in dealing with the larger Jewish majority which sustains 
the state-inscribed identity. Defensive reactions on the part of the Jewish 
majority and the state attempt to delegitimize such individuals. Conversely, data 
from a field research realized by the author of this article show these claims 
are void. They show such changes come about as consequence of gaining 
awareness of contradictions between the declared values in the nationalist 
culture and the realities it produces on the ground.This article also points to 
the problems derived from amalgamtion of Jewish and Zionist identities, and 
their uses in delegitimizing discenting voices.The article points out that not 
all reactions to gaining awareness of incongruences are the same, options 
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often being made between keeping one’s moral values and relinquishing one’s 
identity, or keeping identity and relinquishing one’s values, wihch in the case of 
Israeli and Diaspora Jews, means becoming more radicalized, often assuming 
openly racist convictions. Relation between identity and morality are drawn 
from writings of various authors, pointing out how the importance of moral 
coherence in identitarian affiliation. Political knowledge is discussed in terms 
of how awareness of changes in historical narrative of facts can reflect on one’s 
world views. Zionism is critiqued by looking at three of its pillars: Jewishness, 
security / militarism, and hegemonic Zionism, exposing patterns that Zionism 
has of modern European nationaisms, a victimhood mentality and a dominant 
Colonialist or Orientalist world view.The unsuspecting trust with which Israeli 
and Diaspora Jews accept this dicorsively-constructed and state-inscribed 
national identity complicates addressing the distortions in perception as well as 
Jewish responsibilities in the conflict. Few become aware of the discrepancies 
mentioned, go through an identity crisis a which usually takes. The majority 
that does not have the opportunity to go through such process, remain with a 
national identity which does not share many of the universal values as most of 
international community, and classically liberal principles of citizenship that 
would forbid discrimination on any basis are seen to them as ‘destructive’ of 
the Jewish state. Approaches to conflict resolution, which traditionally do not 
take into identity dinamics, are doomed to continuousely deal with defensive 
/ aggressive stances prompted by perception of threat. Such approaches tend 
to focus on negotiating between the sides, while investing in intiatives which 
attempt to universalize particualristic values within the identity-driven society 
would contribute more to a real shift in the situation. Such initiatives are civil 
society iniciatives within the Jewish constituency composed of individuals 
who went through the processes describes in this article.Such intra-Jewish 
uni-national initiatives for change show greater potential than bi-national 
negotiation.

